FRANKFORT, Ky. (AP) -- Better lighting, door alarms, closed-circuit campus monitoring and a safety clearinghouse for colleges were among the recommendations of a campus safety task force, led by a woman whose son died in a dormitory fire in Kentucky nearly a decade ago.The 15 members of the task force have spent eight months meeting and holding public hearings before issuing its 24-page report, the state Environmental and Public Protection Cabinet announced Friday.
Gail Minger, who son, Michael, died in a dormitory fire at Murray State University in 1998, headed the panel, which also included representatives of campus security, fire safety, colleges, universities, parents and students.
"We had the opportunity to look at the areas of concern that have emerged the past several years," Minger said in a statement from the cabinet. "The most important recommendation may be the formation of the proposed Center for Campus Safety. It would serve as a clearinghouse for information, to help with best practices and to assist all universities." ...
This from Wave 3 TV.
1 comment:
Somewhere in this near mass hysteria over campus security, the media needs to stop breathlessly reporting on the technology - like mass paging systems - and take a more critical look at the solutions being implemented.
For example:
Pack 20,000 into a relatively small area, maybe 200 to 500 acres, including many of these people clustered in large buildings in rooms in multi-storied structures. Add vehicles and bicycles into the scene.
Now send out an text message to those 20,000 people at the same time.
Emergency! Emergency! Emergency!
Evacuate? Lock Down? What exactly do you include in text message sent simultaneously to 20,000 people crowded into a very small space?
Problem #1: This emergency notification system is based primarily on the Virginia Tech scenario in which two hours elapsed between shooting incidents. In almost half of all other school shootings, the incident was over in 15 minutes or less. So unless the next school shooter follows Cho’s strategy and stops to mail his ravings to a major TV network, emergency text messaging is not going to do too much other than initiate near hysteria.
Problem #2: Frightened people do not flee in an orderly fashion. How do “active shooter” police teams travel to the incident site when thousands of panicked people have grid locked the entire area?
Problem #3: With police and emergency personnel unable to reach the incident scene, how does an administrator decide that a lock-down is the best course of action? Columbine was planned as a bombing, not a shooting. The next attacker may be more proficient at bomb-making and use a lock-down as a means to increase the casualties.
Problem #4: How does an administrator prevent a repeat of the Jonesboro, Arkansas, incident in which the shooters deliberately created an evacuation situation in order to shoot students as they fled the school buildings? The primary supply of information – police and fire units – are overwhelmed by the human stampede fleeing the campus.
Problem #5: How do cell towers transmit 20,000 simultaneous text messages, along with the staggering amount of cellular traffic immediately following the transmission? Responding police and fire units will not only be unable to respond, but cell phone communication will be nearly impossible due to system overload.
But it doesn't stop there.
University of Nevada is considering deputizing and arming the faculty.
The South Carolina legislature narrowly defeated a proposal to allow students carry guns on campus provided they have a concealed carry permit.
Florida State University initiated a campus-wide audio alert system, but instead of planning for its emergency use, also plays the Seminole war chant and announces the opening of the add/drop time schedule. In addition, on hearing the audio alert, students are directed to go into buildings for more information - even though more than 90% of all school shootings occurred inside of school buildings.
This emergency text messaging system is just as inane as arming the faculty and students, or using the PA system to play the school fight song. Having spent nearly 25 years in both law enforcement and corporate security environments, as well as providing advanced threat assessment and response, I am increasingly dismayed at this knee-jerk reaction to campus safety. What's more, very few if any programs involve prevention rather than reactive strategies. Advising schools to plan for instead of prevent school shootings is like advising them to also buy additional body bags.
Killers like Cho are identifiable through a number of ways well before they fire the first shot. For one thing, they leak their psychosis and leave what amounts to trace evidence of their mental deterioration. No school shooters just "snap," although this is another bit of conventional wisdom that's as dangerous as it is in error. Like workplace violence and public figure assassinations, the attackers in school shootings do not act impulsively, waking up one morning to decide to kill as many fellow students as possible and then themselves.
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