Showing posts sorted by date for query Peggy Petrilli. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query Peggy Petrilli. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Friday, May 30, 2014

FCPS Bd of Ed: Compromise amid Disparagement

Fayette school board approves tentative budget 
despite parents' requests to wait for audit

Compromise found

A subdued Vice Chair Melissa Bacon called the Fayette County Board of Education to order Wednesday evening to deal with disputes over the Fayette County public schools proposed budget. Despite a dry and generally incomprehensible initial presentation by Financial Director Rodney Jackson the meeting was a well-choreographed refutation of the blistering charges leveled by Budget and Staffing Director Julane Mullins a day earlier.

Notably, Ms. Mullins was not present.

The upshot of Jackson's explanation was that there were no irregularities involving $20 million and  that the GASB 54 standards (required of all government financial accounting entities) are difficult to understand. This was backed up by Bill Meyer a partner with Strothman & Company, the district's hired auditor. Audit reports that I have seen in the past always had a disclaimer that states the audit is based solely on the numbers given to the auditors by the school district. Trash in? Trash out. If the numbers are bad, an audit can come back clean despite hidden problems. But two board members cited previous clean audits as assurance that nothing could be wrong.


In the end, the general consensus seemed to be that everyone was just going to have to wait for State Auditor Adam Edelen to make a ruling on the issue.

One issue of concern to special education parents has been the deployment of special education staff and services. A generalized fear that has been expressed by many parents in recent years was recently exacerbated by the district's association with the District Management Council, a group that advocates raising class sizes and reducing supports for special needs students. CAO Lu Young addressed the district's position.


Parents and business leaders spoke to various concerns and committed support for the district leadership. For example, Sandy Jones spoke emotionally about the needs of special needs students in the district and the plan to reduce paraprofessionals.



Perhaps the most cogent presentation of the evening came from former legislator (and Cassidy Dad) Bill Lear. While I think Bill overstated the avenues available to employees to call out problems - particularly wrongdoings - and survive within the organization, his presentation was eloquent, supported the proposed amendments to the budget, and provided a wider view of the issues.

Following Lear was former Lexington Vice Mayor Mike Scanlon who chose a bare knuckles religiously and politically-conscious approach; one laced with innuendo and character assassination. He apologized repeatedly to our public board because members were forced to endure questioning despite the fine job three of them were doing. He described imagined enemies who had the temerity to challenge district leadership - and went on to demonstrate the craft of character assassination in the hands of a master.

His personal attacks were allowed by acting Chair Melissa Bacon, one assumes because Scanlon did not call out anyone by name, which seems to be the limit of Bacon's scrutiny. However, the individuals he referred to were personally identifiable and he left no mystery about Ms. Mullins and her attorney. The same acting Chair who lambasted Sharon Mosfiled-Boswell for using a person's name to identify that individual's contract with the district, sat passively as Scanlon did his work. She apparently failed to realize that Scanlon's remarks disparaged individuals and violated the board's own policy. One is left to assume the application of the rule is dependent upon whom one disparages.



Then Scanlon went after Brenda Allen, attacking the lawyer "who was let go by the school system for reasons well-known to everybody."

Everybody knows? That's a dubious assertion.
Does everyone remember that the Fayette County Board of Education paid Allen $200,000 in exchange for her promise to forgo suing former FCPS Superintendent Stu Silberman? Allen had threatened to file suit against the board alleging that her position was eliminated as "a reprisal and/or unlawful retaliation" in breach of her contract and in violation of state law.
Allen had been tasked by Stu Silberman to draft the report that was used to push Peggy Petrilli out of her principalship at Booker T. Washington  Elementary School. But somewhere along the way Allen's objections to Silberman's tactics wore thin. Sources within the district office told KSN&C that Allen let it be known that a pivotal meeting in the Petrilli case should have been conducted differently, and might not have resulted in legal action at all, if it had been handled more competently by an attorney.

Eventually the superintendent went out and bought himself a flimsy report, from a management firm that promotes outsourcing, advising the board that it would be cheaper and better to outsource district legal services, leaving district principals in the lurch. Silberman realized that the district's effort to portray Allen's dismissal as a reduction-in-force wasn't going to stand up and the district settled. Allen took the $200 K and opened a restaurant and law firm in Frankfort. The decision to outsource all legal services was reversed by Shelton fairly early in his tenure with the district.

Since the former Vice Mayor got me thinking about it, here's the backstory on former FCPS legal counsel Brenda Allen.
Anyway, Scanlon's barbs drew a snappy response from Board member Doug Barnett.


Rounding out the evening, a somber Amanda Ferguson praised the courage of Julane Mullins and lamented her absence at the meeting.

Ferguson reminded the Board of it's anti-fraud policy which requires due diligence on the part of board members, and said that she could not in good conscience support the budget despite the adoption of changes she advocated.



This from the Herald-Leader:
The Fayette County school board restored some controversial cuts to the 2014-15 tentative budget before approving it 4-1 Wednesday night.

The tentative budget, now about $428.4 million, has been the subject of debate for months among parents, students and teachers. The board approved the budget even though some parents asked members to wait until Kentucky Auditor Adam Edelen completes an examination of allegations made this week by the district's budget director that an irregularity in accounting led to a budget crisis.

The cuts to the budget now total about $17.5 million instead of the $19.1 million Superintendent Tom Shelton proposed in April. The adjustments the board made at Wednesday's meeting included:
■ Restoring cuts to band and orchestra programs.
■ Limiting reductions to the district's special schools and programs to 3 percent
■ Changing the staffing reduction for classified employees — such as bus drivers and maintenance workers — from 5 percent to 3 percent.
■ Restoring $56,000 for trips and activities for students who receive free and reduced-price lunches and otherwise could not afford to participate.
■ Increasing the reserves for the district's special education program from $1 million to $2 million. A proposal to cut 97 aides and add seven special education teachers remained.
■ Limiting the number of paid days that could be cut for an individual employee to five.
Wednesday's meeting was necessary because the board did not approve the budget May 19 after members Doug Barnett and Amanda Ferguson objected to cuts, including those to orchestra and band programs. Barnett changed his vote Wednesday, joining Melissa Bacon, Daryl Love and board Chairman John Price in voting yes. Price voted via videoconferencing from his hospital room at the Markey Cancer Center, where he is recovering from a bone marrow transplant.
Ferguson voted no. She said she was pleased about the restoration of budget cuts. But she said that District Budget Director Julane Mullins' allegations raised serious issues.

"I cannot completely disregard Ms. Mullins' 16 years of experience in the district budget and staffing office, particularly since she has absolutely no reason to fabricate these claims," Ferguson said. "In fact, she makes them at particular risk to her own professional reputation and likely with extreme personal discomfort."

By approving the budget, the board met a May 30 deadline to submit a tentative budget to the Kentucky Department of Education. The board must approve a final budget by Sept. 30, and Shelton said there could be more changes depending upon revenues the district received.

The process that the district went through to get an approved budget was good, Shelton said, though it was challenging, creating "some emotional discussions" and "difficult conversations."

Earlier Wednesday, the presidents of two Fayette County Public Schools employee groups said they could not support the passage of the district's tentative budget until Edelen finished "special examination" into allegations of a $20 million irregularity in the Fayette Schools' budget. Edelen spokeswoman Stephenie Hoelscher said Wednesday that "this week we will send in auditors and begin gathering documentation, and we'll begin putting together the scope."

Fayette County Education Association President Jessica Hiler and Fayette County Education Support Professionals Association President Doug Botkin issued a joint statement Wednesday, saying "we cannot support the passage of any budget until this audit is complete." FCEA is a voluntary association that represents teachers. FCESPA is a voluntary association representing other school employees.

"Our members believe it is important that the community fully understand the reasons for the $20 million shortfall, so that we can be sure it does not happen again," the statement said.

Mullins said the district's current $20 million shortfall was caused by irregular accounting but worsened with "numerous acts of mismanagement," according to an email sent to school board members, as well as Edelen.

Mullins' email said a $20 million journal entry in 2011 was "irregular" because Rodney Jackson, the district's director of finance, made the entry on Dec. 6, 2011, six months after it should have been included.

Mullins said the late entry caused the working budget for 2012-13 to be approved by the board with numbers that were inflated by $20 million.

Shelton denied the allegations, as did Jackson in a presentation to the board at the meeting. Jackson told the board that $20 million was never missing. Jackson and Shelton, whose spending was also questioned in the email, said Mullins' accusations stemmed from misunderstandings of routine budgeting procedures.

Shelton reiterated after that the board meeting that the $20 million journal entry that Mullins mentioned had nothing to do with the $20 million budget reduction, which was due to the district overspending its revenue. Jackson said the journal entry did not affect the fund balance of Fayette County Public Schools either before or after the transaction. The district's outside auditor told the board that he had reviewed the allegations and Jackson's documentation and that there were no improprieties.

Jackson provided documents which he said showed that there was no erroneous or abnormal transaction. Mullins' attorney, Brenda Allen, has said Mullins was willing to share 1,000 pages of documents with investigators.

Attorney and former state lawmaker Bill Lear and business leader Mike Scanlon were among those asking the board to approve the budget despite the allegations.

In addition to Edelen's office, both Mullins and Shelton have asked the state Office of Education Accountability to investigate. Karen Timmel-Hatzell, OEA's acting director, said her office, which looks at violations of laws affecting schools, will wait until Edelen finishes his investigation "because we don't want to duplicate effort when we are all going to be looking at the exact same thing."
I would say that this was the most contentious issue a superintendent could be called upon to handle if it weren't for the looming redistricting effort that recently got underway. That'll bring angry displaced parents out of the woodwork.

Read more here: http://www.kentucky.com/2014/05/28/3262954/state-auditor-says-he-will-do.html#storylink=cpy

Wednesday, November 30, 2011

Peggy and Dennis

Remember this Guy?

Sure you do.

That's former NBA star Dennis Rodman, the poster child for the Competence-Deviance Hypothesis. In a nutshell, the premise is that the more competent an individual is, the more deviance will be tolerated in him or her by others. So in the case of Dennis Rodman, Detroit, San Antonio, Chicago and others all tolerated, at some expense, Dennis's proclivities for flamboyant stylings - even those that were a big departure from the expectations placed on others.

Why? There was a lot Dennis could not do; like shoot freethrows or hit a 3-pointer.

The reason lies in what Dennis could do. He could rebound. He could rebound a lot. Over a 14-year career Rodman pulled down an average of 13.1 rebounds a night. 18 per game in his prime at Detroit in 91-92 when he gathered more than thousand for the season.

Given so much competence in a critical area - Dennis was allowed to be deviant in others.

This was essentially the argument made by Superintendent Stu Silberman and the Fayette County school directors who evaluated former BTWA Principal Peggy Petrilli as they try to explain to the jury how anyone could rack up such a significant list of management problems - a list that would place lesser beings squarely in the cross hairs - and not have a one of them show up on her evaluations.

Catch us tomorrow morning and I'll share today's testimony as Petrilli's attorney bore down.

In the meantime...here are a few tweets: Read 'em from the bottom up.

Reday000Court in recess until Monday morning.about 1 hour ago from mobile web

Reday000Jurors indicate to Judge that they all can continue to serve next week. from mobile web

Reday000Plaintiff rests. from mobile web

Reday000Judge says it looks like another long day Monday...possible Tuesday. from mobile web

Reday000 Golden calls Brenda Allen. Court rules Allen does not have to appear due to attorney client privilege. from mobile web

Reday000Judge confers with attorneys on remainder of trial. from mobile web

Reday000Silberman excused. from mobile web

Reday000Golden: "Wasn't the goal to send Carmen & Fabio out to her house, to pressure her to resign. from mobile web

Reday000Golden bears down on Silberman. from mobile web

Reday000Stu: That's the bottom line on this whole situation. I did not make Peggy leave. from mobile web

Reday000"Did you throw Peggy under the bus? Stu "Oh no. Peggy made the decision to leave." from mobile web

Reday000Court resumes. Stu still on the stand. from mobile web
 
Reday000After side bar...McNeilll begins cross. from mobile web

Reday000Golden: "Didn't you decide it would just be easier to turn your back on Peggy?" Stu: "That is just not true." from mobile web

Reday000Golden concludes. McNeil reserves right to recall Silberman. Does not cross. from mobile web

Reday000Stu: Peggy could have gone back to BTWA. from mobile web

Reday000Stu is back on the stand. Lisa Stone is probably next. from mobile web

Reday000Trial resumes. from mobile web

Reday000McNeilll's client is Stu but it's also the Board. Is that the thing? ? ? ? from mobile web

Reday000Doesn't Stu own the privilege? Can't he waive it at will? Hummmm. from mobile web

Reday000...but he didn't say everything he wanted to citing priv. My question is.... from mobile web

Reday000...attny/client priv. Stu told the jury he wanted to answer and that "it was critical." ... from mobile web

Reday000Is there a lawyer in the house? Before lunch Golden asked Stu a question involving the board attorney. McNeilll cautioned Stu about ... from mobile web

Reday000This AM: Ishmael admonished attorneys "Remember Rule # 1...Attnys ask...Witnesses answer...and can explain. from mobile web

Reday000Stu said: I knew her to be an outstanding instructional leader...had a significant issue with management...relationships from mobile web

Reday000Court in recess until 1PM from mobile web

Reday000Stu: Sir, There was nothing more that I wanted than for Peggy Petrilli to succeed from mobile web

Reday000Stu on Aug 22 Mtg:I thought it was just one more thing that Peggy had gotten us into. I was there to smooth things out. from mobile web

Friday, March 11, 2011

Petrilli Appeal Denied

Court of Appeals Affirms Judge Ishmael in Petrilli Case

Procedural Error Helps Sink Petrilli

The “failure to specifically object
to the final written instructions means
the objection to the language. . .
has not been properly preserved for our review.”

--Kentucky Court of Appeals

Despite negative comments made during oral arguments by two of the three appeals court judges regarding jury instructions in the Petrilli case, the panel upheld those instructions in favor of the lower court and the Fayette County Schools today.

Former Booker T Washington Academy Principal Peggy Petrilli had appealed an August 14, 2009, judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court dismissing, with prejudice, her claims against defendants, Fayette County Public Schools Superintendent Stu Silberman, and the Fayette County Board of Education.
Silberman and the Board cross appealed, asserting several errors by the trial court.
The Appeals Court ruling can be found by searching 2009-CA-001925 at the court's website.

Despite the judges' misgivings about the jury instruction, the court ultimately agreed with school district Attorney John McNeill that Petrilli did not "preserve the issue" of the threshold jury instruction for appellate review.
Failure to preserve an issue for review is a procedural matter for the courts. As I understand it, in order to “preserve” an issue for appellate review, the attorney must object to the matter during the trial, and it must be ruled on by the judge. McNeil argued successfully that Petrilli's Attorney J. Dale Golden’s objections came during a preliminary hearing, not during the trial itself.
The full court reasoned,
Petrilli argues that the trial court erred in creating a threshold jury instruction that superseded the elements for reverse discrimination, retaliation, and violation of the Kentucky Whistleblower Act.

The jury was given the following threshold jury instruction: “Do you believe from the evidence that the Plaintiff, Peggy Petrilli, voluntarily resigned from her position as principal of Booker T. Washington Academy on August 27, 2007?”

The jury marked “yes” and returned to the courtroom where the trial judge discharged them from further duties. Ms. Petrilli argues that the threshold instruction was given in error because it is completely different from the elements of her claims for reverse discrimination, retaliation, and violation of the Kentucky
Whistleblower Act.

The appellees argue that Petrilli did not preserve the issue of the threshold jury instruction for appellate review. In support of this argument, the appellees argue that Petrilli cites a discussion before the close of proof for the preservation of this issue. However, the record reveals that this was a preliminary discussion over the general structure of the jury instructions. According to the appellees, the trial court made it clear that it had put together an amalgamation set of instructions which included elements of both the Plaintiff and Defendant’s tendered instructions “for a
place to start” in drafting the final instructions.

According to the appellees, the trial court did not issue its final jury instructions until later that day, and only after the close of proof. Petrilli made no objection at that time to the threshold Question No. 1, and instead only objected to Jury Instruction No. 1, and her objection only dealt with whether the instruction should include a finding that Petrilli was a member of a protected class as it pertained to the reverse discrimination claim.

The “failure to specifically object to the final written instructions means the objection to the language. . . has not been properly preserved for our review.” Boland-Maloney Lumber Co., Inc. v. Burnett, 302 S.W.3d 680, 690 (Ky.App. 2009). Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 51(2) and (3) provide:
(2) After considering any tendered instructions ... the court shall show the parties the written instructions it will give the jury, allowing them an opportunity to make objections out of the hearing of the jury.

(3) No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he has fairly and adequately presented his position by an offered instruction or by motion, or unless he makes objection before the court instructs the jury, stating specifically the matter to which he objects and the ground or grounds of his objection.
Because Ms. Petrilli did not object to the threshold jury instruction at the close of proof, we agree with the appellees that she did not preserve this argument for review on appeal.
Petrilli argues that simply tendering her own jury instructions preserved this issue for appeal. We disagree. In Boland, the Appellant submitted its own instructions, and in lieu of objecting to the language they later took issue with on appeal, asked the court if they could “stand on their instructions as submitted.” Id. at 690.
A panel of this Court held that the particular language the Appellant argued on appeal was improper, had not been objected to specifically, and thus the matter was
not properly preserved for appeal. In the instant case, Petrilli objected to a different jury instruction regarding her inclusion in a protected class for her reverse discrimination claim, but did not specifically object to the “voluntary” language contained threshold Question No. 1. Accordingly, Petrilli did not preserve this argument for appeal to this Court.
But that's not all. The court turned 180 degrees from their comments during oral arguments and concluded,
We agree with the appellees that the trial court’s reasoning for including the threshold jury instruction/question was basic and correct. If the jury believed from the evidence that Petrilli voluntarily resigned, then necessarily they must not have believed she was constructively discharged.

Judges Acree and Thompson agreed with the majority in the result only, and Judge Thompson wrote a separate opinion citing his disagreement with the court's analysis in the jury instruction finding. However, he writes that,

Despite my disagreement with the majority’s legal analysis, I nevertheless concur in the result because, at the close of trial, the appellees were entitled to a directed verdict. The evidence established that the parents, not the school board, were the perpetrators of the conduct complained of by Petrilli.

Perhaps Silberman's strongest argument throughout the case was his offer to return Petrilli to Northern Elementary. In a footnote the court agreed saying,

"a lateral transfer of a principal is not even considered a demotion as defined by [KRS 161.720]...Therefore, Silberman could have sent Petrilli back to Northern Elementary without her consent and without recourse. However, she declined the lateral transfer and instead resigned her position."

Saturday, February 12, 2011

FCPS Appellee's Brief and Cross Appeal

Appellate review in Petrilli v Silberman, and whether former Booker T Washington Principal Peggy Petrilli is granted a new trial, hangs on the question of Judge James Ishmael’s threshold jury instruction:
“Do you believe from the evidence that the Plaintiff, Peggy Petrilli, voluntarily resigned from her position as principal of Booker T. Washington Academy on August 2, 2007?”
Juries have tremendous power over people's lives. Granting them such power directly expresses our faith in the system of justice, democratic governance, and whether the public has faith that jury verdicts can be fair, unbiased, and accurate.

In recent years, however, concerns have been raised about the quality and integrity of the outcomes reached by juries. Some believe that jurors are too frequently biased, or incompetent to render just verdicts. Jurors can misunderstand instructions from the judge on legal issues, fail to recall critical evidence, or suffer from boredom during trials - particularly in complex trials.
For these reasons, and perhaps others, the quality of jury instructions is critical to guiding the jury toward a result that is based on sound legal principles rather than biased, arbitrary or sloppy reasoning.

The central question under review in Petrilli v Silberman is whether a fair set of jury instructions existed, but there's some other stuff too. The district wants the Court of Appeals to agree that Petrilli voluntarily resigned and leave Fayette County Circuit Court Judge James Ishmael's ruling undisturbed. They request the court to confirm the trial jury or alternatively grant the district's cross appeal for a directed verdict on all issues, which would pretty much do the same thing.

KSN&C had hoped to present the district’s arguments alongside those of Appellant Peggy Petrilli, but we were unable to secure the cooperation of counsel for the school district. KSN&C thanks Sam Givens at the Kentucky Court of Appeals and Judge Ishmael for their assistance.

The following is a summary of the district’s point of view.

District arguments in Petrilli v Silberman:

· The threshold jury instruction was not preserved for review. This is a procedural argument and I won’t pretend to understand its subtleties. Apparently, in order to “preserve” an issue for appellate review, the attorney must …do something…like object. Objections are preserved for appellate review only if those objections are made and ruled on in the trial court. And McNeil argues that Dale Golden’s objections came during a preliminary hearing, as KSN&C has reported. See: Nebraska Law Review for a discussion. So, if I’ve got this argument right, McNeill says Golden objected to the jury instruction during a preliminary hearing, but not in the trial court, and therefore, it was not properly preserved. I would only note that during oral argument, the judges were aware of this argument but at least two of the judges did not appear to be buying it.

· McNeill says the threshold jury instruction was proper. Golden seeks what is called a de novo review of Judge Ishmael’s threshold jury instruction and McNeill says that’s not the correct way for the court to look at it. “The threshold jury instruction was proper because once the jury found that Petrilli voluntarily resigned, she could no longer meet the essential elements necessary to prove her claims of an adverse employment action.” McNeill pins his position on the argument that Petrilli was not under any time pressure (which might give rise to a constructive discharge) because she first brought up the idea of resignation, did so with advice from counsel, negotiated her separation, and had been given options to avoid resignation, including suspension with pay, which McNeill told the court was not an adverse employment action. Again, it is not clear that the appellate judges bought this argument.

· The district argues that Petrilli had no right to a constructive discharge jury instruction because it was not properly preserved, Petrilli’s arguments are misleading, and that during the pre-trial stage of the case, Golden had argued that they were not making a constructive discharge claim.

· McNeill argues that the court erred in not granting the district a directed verdict on the reverse discrimination claim and that Petrilli did not suffer an adverse employment action. McNeill says Petrilli confuses not wanting to resign with choosing to voluntarily resign once confronted with substantial complaints about her running of the school.

· McNeill states that Petrilli was qualified to serve as principal…

· ..but that she was replaced by a white man, Jock Gum. Gum had served as an interim principal, finishing out the year. However, the hiring of Wendy Brown, a black woman, was at the core of the case, and here McNeill argues that Silberman and the board could not be held responsible because it was the school council who hired Brown.

· The district says that the court improperly failed to grant their motion for a directed verdict on retaliation claims, whistleblower claims.

· …that the trial court was correct to excuse Brenda Allen from any claims.

· …that the court properly handled jury selection.

· …that the trial court was correct to disallow testimony from Allen.

· …that the court was correct to overrule complaints from Golden against McNeill, and a requested second deposition of Doug Adams. During oral argument, one judge made statements inferring that the misconduct claim would likely go nowhere.

· …that the court was correct to overrule Petrilli’s Motion in Limine on prior bad acts when it allowed testimony on related issues at BTWA.

· …some lawyerly something about how McNeill used depositions to impeach and rehabilitate witnesses…

· That the court erred by refusing to dismiss Silberman as officially and as an individual.

Tuesday, February 08, 2011

Appeals Court Signals Remand of Petrilli Case

School District Attorney Argues
Plaintiffs should Sue School Councils
Rather than Superintendents
in School-based
Racial Discrimination Claims

Ruling Expected in Mid march

During Oral Argument before the Kentucky Court of Appeals today, two judges openly and repeatedly expressed doubts about Fayette County Circuit Court Judge James Ishmael’s threshold instruction to the jury in Petrilli v Silberman.

In deliberation during the trial, jurors were only allowed to consider whether they thought former Booker T Washington Principal Peggy Petrilli had resigned voluntarily. The jury made their decision while looking at a handwritten resignation letter from Petrilli that read, in its entirety, “I hereby resign my position in the Fayette County Schools” with no effective date.

None of the other issues related to civil rights, retaliation, or whistleblower claims were considered by the jury since they found her resignation to be voluntary.

That result undermined J Dale Golden’s constructive discharge claim and exonerated Fayette County Schools Superintendent Stu Silberman and the Fayette County Board of Education.

Responding to an argument from Golden, Judge Kelly Thompson said, “I don’t agree with that threshold instruction either…” Later during John McNeill’s argument, Judge Glenn Acree said, “I, too, have a problem with this instruction…I’m not sure a jury understands [everything that goes into making a resignation] voluntary.”

McNeill argued that the superintendent and board weren’t guilty of anything, that the jury instruction was proper because it contained the word “voluntary,” and that Golden’s assertion of constructive discharge was made “without evidence.”

Judge James Lambert made no specific assertions during questioning but only two judges are needed to prevail on any particular point of law.

The only clue about the court's leaning on the central issue of whether Petrilli voluntarily resigned came from Judge Acree who said at one point, “It sounds like she didn’t want to leave.”

I'm no attorney but it sounds like this case may be headed back to Fayette County. But we won’t know for sure until sometime in mid March. A ruling is expected in 30 to 45 days.



Each side was given 15 minutes to argue points of law and procedures before the court. Golden, representing Appellant Peggy Petrilli, chose to argue for 10-minutes and reserve 5-minutes for rebuttal. John McNeill, representing Stu Silberman and the Board of Education used all 15-minutes for argument – thus allowing Golden to speak first and last.

Most of the court’s attention was on the threshold jury instruction, and the question of whether Kentucky’s school council laws have the effect of insulating superintendents and school boards from discrimination claims.

What did the school board do wrong? one judge asked. You tell us about the Clarks and Ms Berry but what about the board?

“If there is a racial discrimination claim, who would you sue?” Acree asked repeatedly. McNeill opined that one must sue individual school council members. Golden argued that it was appropriate to sue the superintendent who is ultimately in charge of everything.

The district filed a Cross Appeal claiming that Judge Ishmael should have issued a directed verdict on all of Petrilli’s claims because they all lacked evidence. During a pretrial hearing, Judge James Ishmael had rejected the district's request for summary judgment saying,

"Right now, I’m not comfortable that the facts are so undisputed, that I feel comfortable making a ruling as a matter of law."
Golden argued that all of Petrilli’s other claims should have survived any resignation. For example, if a woman is raped at work, she does not have to keep working there to have a case, Golden said.

From Twitter: (READ FROM THE BOTTOM UP.)

Reday000 Adjourned. Court indicates it will respond in 30 to 45 days.
Reday000 when asked...says Buddy Clark was disbarred in Chicago.
Reday000 Golden: Voluntary was not defined. Threshhold question was inappropriate.
Reday000 Golden rebuttal begins. Thompson demures on sanction question.
Reday000 McNeill denies sanctionable conduct.
Reday000 McNeill defending jury instruction because it contained the word voluntary.
Reday000 Acree: I, too, have a problem with this instruction...not sure jury understands what voluntary means...
Reday000 Acree: If there was a racial discrimination claim, who would you sue?
Reday000 District filed cross appeal saying there should have been a directed verdict on all of Petrill's claims.
Reday000 Acree: "It sounds like she didn't want to leave."
Reday000 McNeill says constructive discharge claim was without evidence.
Reday000 McNeill is up.
Reday000 Golden: "This was a hatchet job."
Reday000 Golden goes after McNeill's conduct during trial.
Reday000 Golden argues whistleblower & civil rights claims should survive any resignation.
Reday000 Brenda Allen is in attendance.
Reday000 ...what did the school board do?
Reday000 Thompson: "I don't agree with that threshhold instruction either. That's not my problem...
Reday000 Each side gets 15 minutes. Golden goes first.
Reday000 Lambert presiding. Welcomes and introduces.

Monday, February 07, 2011

Where We're Coming From

Over the weekend a reader lamented that it was difficult for them to figure out what side KSN&C was on when it came to several issues.

[Edited] Richard, you were quoted as saying you would give Mr. Silberman a 95% approval rating (in the Herald-Leader last week). If you feel this way, why would you continue to print these posts about Mr. Silberman?

Or are you meaning to say the treatment of Goodin, Hurley-Richards, and Petrilli (which you clearly disapprove of) amounted to the 5% of Mr. Silberman's actions you disagreed with?

Or am I misreading the the posts? Perhaps you feel that Petrilli needed to be forced out of Booker T, Goodin needed to be escorted from Jesse Clark by security guards after she filed an civil rights complaint, and Hurley-Richards needed to fired after her altercation with a student at Cardinal Valley? From a confused reader.....


Yeah, I can see how that’s confusing. But maybe that’s a good sign. When KSN&C reports something, there is a sincere effort to tell both sides of the story.

Public debate is so “partisan” these days that everyone expects a writer to be “for” or “against” each person. This is a news and commentary site that tries to shoot down the middle. We report facts related to news stories with source citations or links, and distinguish the reporting from the opinions. As time permits, we do original reporting.

KSN&C does not allow flaming, but readers are invited to share their opinions as well. We even print reader’s anonymous comments (which we are not in love with, but understand the position some folks are in) even when those comments are critical of KSN&C.

When Jim Warren asked my opinion of Fayette county Schools Superintendent Stu Silberman’s administration, I considered his administration in total. And KSN&C readers may recall, I have argued that he is most likely Fayette County’s third most effective (best) superintendent in history, behind M. A. Cassidy and Guy Potts. I say likely, because although I have studied the history of the schools extensively, I have not completed the work that would have to be done to say that definitively. Cassidy, Potts and Silberman share a crucial characteristic. They were strong leaders. Cassidy and Silberman were also leaders during transitional periods in educational history.

I hope readers know that I have a deep respect for the job today’s superintendents are called to do. Love him or hate him; Stu Silberman took a rudderless district of 33,000 students or so, and charted a clear course. He advocated, pushed and shoved, to move the district in a unified direction. He set high goals, fixed the buildings and was effective in the community. He worked tirelessly, made countless decisions, managed a huge budget and motivated lots of people. Despite claims made elsewhere that FCPS was a district in trouble (due to NCLB results) we have maintained Silberman’s student achievement data are rather good. If a superintendent can do all that over a seven-year period and come out without too many dings, that person has performed way above average. The fact that he may have performed with his ego intact bothers me not at all. At times it has appeared to be too much about the man, and some have thought him thin-skinned, but I don’t know a strong leader who doesn’t believe in their own abilities to make change occur.

Had Warren asked me to rate Silberman on personnel matters alone, I would have had a harder time quantifying. As one reader pointed out recently, with Stu, sometimes it became a question of whether the ends justify the means.

I first became concerned about Silberman’s potential for snap judgments in personnel matters early in his tenure when a close associate was demoted - reportedly for failing to prevent her faculty from speaking at a board meeting; arguably their constitutional right. But that individual chose not to complain, I certainly did not investigate and it did not become a news story (and that was pre KSN&C, anyway). The objective data showed that the demoted principal’s scores jumped 12 points that year and I think it was a bad call.

When Peggy Petrilli jumped ship (or was pushed overboard – we’ll see what the appeals court says) it was a news story. We didn’t invent it. But we did pick it up; investigated, and reported. Heck, we even tweeted. For those of us who study school administration, this was an important story. Here you had the modern version of school leadership on trial. Petrilli was Silberman’s highly touted gap warrior and his “Sophie’s Choice” moment dealt him a blow. KSN&C explored both sides’ legal briefs and the testimony. We expressed surprise over the judge’s jury instructions the minute he gave them and printed material that was surely uncomfortable to both sides. Neither Petrilli nor Silberman wanted their dirty laundry aired, but the alternative was to not report. As a direct result of our reporting, I believe, FCPS began truly evaluating its principals. The district had been giving everyone high marks previously, as was revealed in testimony from district administration.

Readers and confidential sources pointed us to the Jill Cowan, Rosalind Hurley-Richards and transportation department stories along with a few more. Some things we print. Some we don’t. We don’t swing at every pitch and try to verify (through triangulation) stories before we print anything. When an allegation is unconfirmed, we say so.

It's too soon for me to know if the transportation department allegations are true or where the story may go.

I'm not sure Cowan deserved an interview, but I was always taught that when interviewing a woman (or any individual in a protected class), the last thing you wanted to tell them was that you were going hire someone from a different class - because of that class. Plus, suspending someone on the day they made a civil rights complaint takes balls the size of Alpha Centauri. If that's what happened, the district deserves to lose, but there won't be anything to celebrate. However it goes, we'll report it.

Teachers deserve the court's consideration when handling situations with tough students. On the other hand, nobody should support the manhandling of students and Silberman apparently believed Hurley-Richards drug the child down the hallway by his neck. The lower court didn't buy the evidence against the teacher and I'm guessing the appeals court won't either. However it goes, we'll report it.

KSN&C was not paying attention when board member Amanda Ferguson asked for a second opinion on the Hanna Report that Silberman had purchased in support of out-sourcing all FCPS legal services. The report stunk to high heaven, and we said so. Then we followed the story all the way to its conclusion when the Herald-Leader revealed the $200,000 payoff to keep Allen quiet. We did not print everything we knew.

KSN&C has no vote on any boards, does not hold public office, and makes no decisions regarding any school personnel or policies - but many of our readers are such persons. We do ask tough questions, second-guess the decision makers, and challenge popular narratives.

KSN&C is a place where discerning readers may come to think about the issues. It is written at the graduate level. We intend to be factual and thought-provoking. What you think is up to you.

Saturday, February 05, 2011

Petrilli's Appeal

The Kentucky Court of Appeals takes up the case of Petrilli v Silberman Tuesday.

In preparation for the hearing KSN&C asked both sides for a copy of their appellate briefs, which are essentially public records. Only one side (attorney J Dale Golden) complied with our request. In a conversation with FCPS attorney John McNeill, KSN&C was told that he didn't see any problem giving us a copy - that is until he realized who we were. Once he recalled, he declined. Go figure.

The central issue on appeal is a threshold jury instruction that boiled the entire case down to the question of whether Appellant Peggy Petrilli, the former principal of Booker T Washington Academy, voluntarily resigned - period. Covering the trial, I recall being stunned by that instruction at the time.

Jurors deliberated for about 3 1/2 hours before concluding that Petrilli "voluntarily resigned from her position as principal of Booker T. Washington Academy on August 27, 2007."

Petrilli claims the jury instruction was inappropriate since she was actually forced out by Fayette County Schools Superintendent Stu Silberman in what is known as a constructive discharge.

KSN&C Timeline of the events here
.

Golden throws a lot of spaghetti at the wall arguing:


· Federal law is applicable in interpreting the Kentucky Civil Rights Act.

· The trial court erred in creating a threshold jury instruction that superseded the elements for reverse discrimination, retaliation, and whistleblower.

· Petrilli Was Entitled to a Directed Verdict on Her Reverse Race Discrimination Claim.

· Petrilli’s Motion For a Directed Verdict On Her Retaliation Claim Should Be Granted AND THE THRESHOLD INSTRUCTION WAS ERRONEOUS.

· the trial court erred in failing to give a separate instruction on whistleblower, failing to direct a verdict, and failing to give a punitive damages instruction.

· It was Error to Dismiss Petrilli’s Constitutional Claims and the Trial Court Erred in Failing to Direct a Verdict on Behalf of Petrilli on her Constitutional Claims.

· THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CLAIMS AGAINST ALLEN.

· The trial Court erred in its handling of the Batson issue.

· THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING PETRILLI’S MOTION IN LIMINE ON CHARACTER EVIDENCE.

· THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SANCTION ATTORNEY MCNEILL AND IN REFUSING TO ALLOW THE SECOND DEPOSITION OF DOUG ADAMS.

· THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY PREVENTING PETRILLI FROM TESTING THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE “ADVICE OF COUNSEL” DEFENSE.

· THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY ALLOWED MCNEILL TO READ FROM DEPOSITIONS. (emphasis in original)


Petrilli is asking the Court of Appeals to :

1. Reverse the trial court for use of a threshold instruction;

2. A directed verdict for Petrilli on the issues of protected class, being qualified for her position, and being replaced by a person of a different race;

3. A directed verdict for Petrilli on the adverse employment issue or, at the very least, a jury instruction setting forth the elements of constructive discharge as tendered by Petrilli;

4. Reverse the trial court and find that Petrilli is entitled to a punitive damages instruction regarding the whistleblower claim;

5. Reverse the trial court’s directed verdict on Petrilli’s constitutional claim;

6. Reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the defamation claim against Allen and the other Defendants;

7. Reverse the trial court’s arbitrary discovery deadline of August 27, 2007;

8. Allow Petrilli to take the discovery deposition of Allen;

9. Reverse the trial court’s ruling on the motions in limine regarding character evidence;

10. Allow Petrilli to retake Adams’ deposition, sanction opposing counsel for his misconduct and award costs and attorneys’ fees; and

11. Direct a verdict in favor of Petrilli on all constitutional claims;

12. Permit Petrilli to test the sufficiency of the “advice of counsel” defense;

13. Reverse the trial court’s erroneous ruling which allowed for improper impeachment and rehabilitation; and,

14. Remand this matter for a new trial.

The crux of the appellant's brief is...

B. The trial court erred in creating a threshold jury instruction that superseded the elements for reverse discrimination, retaliation, and whistleblower. (Preserved at 7/28/09, 08:05:20—09:20:00 a.m., tape 22/3/09/CD/108-8).

This Court uses a de novo standard of review for erroneous jury instructions.[1] The jury was given the following improper threshold jury instruction:

Do you believe from the evidence that the Plaintiff, Peggy Petrilli, voluntarily resigned from her position as principal of Booker T. Washington Academy on August 2, 2007?[2]

The jury marked “yes” and returned to the courtroom where the trial judge discharged them from further duties. The threshold instruction was given in error because it is completely different from the elements of Petrilli’s claims for reverse discrimination, retaliation, and whistleblower, as demonstrated by the jury instructions given by the court.[3]

Petrilli was entitled to a jury instruction regarding her claim of constructive discharge. The standard for constructive discharge is whether the “conditions created by the employer’s action are so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign.”[4] Thus, what may appear to a layman on the jury to be a voluntary resignation may in fact have been compelled by an employer’s conduct. Petrilli was entitled to a jury instruction explaining the difference. In addition, proof of a constructive discharge is but one of a myriad of things that satisfy the requirement of an adverse employment action that is necessary for a reverse discrimination instruction[5] and a retaliation jury instruction.[6]

In Brooks, the court noted: “While constructive discharge may constitute an adverse employment action within the meaning of the KCRA, not all adverse employment actions constitute constructive discharge.”[7] Although Petrilli submitted a constructive discharge instruction, none was given.[8] Constructive discharge instructions are submitted to the jury in these types of cases because a constructive discharge is a type of adverse employment action.[9] The pivotal issue is whether the employee felt compelled to resign. However, the act of resignation as a part of a constructive discharge is but one of many potential adverse employment actions available to support a jury verdict.

(1) The Elements of a reverse discrimination claim are as follows:

(a) Petrilli is a member of a protected class;

(b) She experienced an adverse employment action;

(c) She was qualified for her position of employment; and

(d) She was replaced by a person of a different race.[10]

(2) The elements of a retaliation claim are as follows:

(a) She engaged in a protected activity under KRS 344.040;

(b) This activity was known to the Defendants;

(c) Defendants took an adverse employment action against Petrilli; and

(d) A causal connection exists between that adverse employment action and the Petrilli’s exercise of the protected activity.[11]


(3) The elements for a whistleblower claim are as follows:

(a) She reported actual or suspected violations of law, mandates, rules or policies;

(b) The Defendants caused her to be subjected to reprisal or directly or indirectly used official authority or influence against her as a result of her report.[12]

The trial court specifically found that Petrilli waived all of her claims against the Defendants when she resigned.[13] This rationale on the part of the trial court was erroneous because employers cannot absolve themselves of liability by successfully compelling employees to resign. If Petrilli resigned on a Wednesday, it does not negate retaliation exercised against her in violation of the whistleblower statute that occurred on the prior Tuesday or any day prior to that. In fact, it is not uncommon for employees to resign from their employment when employers act in an unlawful manner.

The discrimination and retaliation claims share a common element of an “adverse employment action.” Thus, if Petrilli resigns on a Wednesday, it does not negate retaliation, or discrimination, or reprisal that occurred on the prior Tuesday or any day prior to that. Again, it is not uncommon for employees to resign from their employment when employees act in an unlawful manner. Petrilli’s resignation is not dispositive because constructive discharge is but one of a myriad of potential adverse employment actions that satisfy the prima facie elements of discrimination and retaliation.

[W]hile constructive discharge may constitute an adverse employment action within the meaning of the KCRA, not all adverse employment actions constitute constructive discharge.[14]

Thus, an adverse employment action includes, but is not limited to, “constructive discharge.” Violations of the law can occur prior to, during, or even after an employee attempts to resign.

Voluntariness is but one component of the larger issue of constructive discharge. Along the same vein, Parker v. Board of Regents of Tulsa Junior College, held that a “resignation is involuntary and coerced when the totality of the circumstances indicates the employee did not have the opportunity to make a free choice.”[15] Scharf v. Dept. of Air Force advises that, in order “to determine whether a resignation or retirement is voluntary, a court must examine the surrounding circumstances to test the ability of the employee to exercise free choice.”[16] Furthermore, “voluntariness is vitiated when one” of the following occurs:

· Employee resigns under duress;

· Employee unsuccessfully tries to withdraw resignation before its effective date;

· Employee submits a resignation under time pressure;

· Employee fails to understand the situation due to mental incompetence; or

· Resignation obtained by misrepresentation or deception.[17]

There was ample evidence presented concerning the strict time constraints imposed on Petrilli. This is important, because a true, voluntary resignation is done when the employee wants to do it, not when the employer orders it done by a certain time.

In Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Stosberg, the Plaintiff signed a resignation letter after her employer attempted to force her to transfer to another location.[18] In effect, the circumstances her employer placed her in left her with no other option. The court thus determined that a constructive discharge occurs where the “conditions created by the employer’s actions” compel the Plaintiff to resign.[19] Northeast Health Management, Inc. v. Cotton, et al. also deals with a situation in which two employees tendered resignation letters.[20] In that case, the employees resigned after their supervisor stopped speaking to them and began assigning their lunch and break times. The jury ultimately found that the employees had been constructively discharged. The Court of Appeals upheld the jury’s decision. In doing so, the Court of Appeals stated that, “while the conditions alleged may not have been the most egregious imaginable, they surely rise to the level that the jury had sufficient evidence to find a constructive discharge.”[21]

Walther testified at length about Petrilli’s financial constraints due to the fact that, unlike teachers, administrators are not covered by the KEA insurance and, therefore, administrators have to pay for their own attorneys.[22] Thus, Petrilli would have paid $25,000.00 at a minimum to go through the tribunal process, while having no money coming in from the school, and while having to care for her adult son, who resides with her and has the mind of a 5-year-old.[23] Certainly, this Court can see that Petrilli recognized that she had no choice and that Silberman was not going to follow the due-process procedures set out in the KAR, KRS, and the Board’s policies. Therefore, the only option Petrilli had was to resign and try to obtain employment elsewhere. She attempted to do this and part ways with Silberman; however, Silberman and Allen manufactured the “investigative memorandum” some 8 months later as an insurance policy against the lawsuit Petrilli was about to file. Having successfully tarred and feathered Petrilli, despite the subsequent finding by the Kentucky Department of Education that there was not enough evidence to support the charges, Petrilli is unemployable in her chosen profession.

In Schultz v. U.S. Navy, the court concluded that “an ostensibly voluntary resignation which was submitted as a result of agency coercion…must be treated the same as an adverse action.”[24] Furthermore, a

resignation is not voluntary where an agency imposes the terms of an employee’s resignation, the employee’s circumstances permit no alternative but to accept, and those circumstances were the result of improper acts of the agency.[25]

The fact that Petrilli’s resignation was not voluntary is demonstrated by the correspondence between Walther and Allen.[26] It was Allen who added on to the correspondence that Petrilli would not reapply in the future for a position with Fayette County Public Schools.[27] It is clear that, if Petrilli had truly voluntarily resigned, she would have simply walked away. It is unconscionable that she had to try and negotiate with Silberman that she be able to leave her employment without mudslinging.

Silberman’s article in the Herald-Leader, stating that Petrilli was not going back to BTWA; his offer of the Northern principalship, followed by a vindictive decision to threaten Petrilli with suspension; and Silberman’s refusal to comply with the evaluation instrument, due process, and evaluation requirements mandated by the KAR and KRS are all indicative of a constructive discharge. “Constructive discharge presents a question of fact that, in jury trials, should be decided by the jury and not the trial court.”[28] The court’s threshold instruction was thus erroneous.
KSN&C will report from the hearing on Tuesday.

[1] Hamilton v. CSX Trans., 208 S.W.3d 272 (Ky.App. 2006).

[2] Record at 2162.

[3] Record at 2163-2167.

[4] Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Hous. Auth., 132 S.W.3d 790, 807 (Ky. 2004).

[5] Record 2163.

[6] Record 2165.

[7] Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Hous. Auth., 132 S.W.3d 790, 807 (Ky. 2004).

[8] Record at 2053-2070.

[9] See, e.g., Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170, 173 (10th Cir. 1982).

[10] Fuelling v. New Vision, 2008 U.S.App. LEXIS 13915 (6th Cir, 2008) at 14; see also Logan v. Denny’s, 259 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2001) Further, according to Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 152 (D.C., 1993), the burden for proving these prima facie elements is “not onerous.”

[11] Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Co. Housing Authority, 132 S.W.3d 790, 803 (Ky. 2004).

[12] Record 2167.

[13] Hearing on the jury instructions to be given, 7/28/09, 08:10:47—08:11:51 a.m., tape 22/3/09/CD/108-8.

[14] Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Hous. Auth., 132 S.W.3d 790, 807 (Ky. 2004).

[15]Parker v. Board of Regents of Tulsa Junior College, 981 F.2d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir. 1992).

[16]Scharf v. Dept. of Air Force, 710 F.2d 1572, 1574 (U.S. Ct. App. Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Pearlman v. United States, 490 F.2d 928, 993 (Ct. Cl. 1974)).

[17] Scharf at 1574. (Emphasis added.)

[18] Commonwealth of Ky v. Stosberg, 948 S.W.2d 425 (Ky. App. 1997).

[19] Id. at 427.

[20] Northeast Health Management, Inc. v. Cotton and Howell, 56 S.W.3d 440 (Ky. App. 2001).

[21] Id. at 446.

[22] Walther Test. 07/20/09, 02:00:57, tape 22/3/09/CD/108-3.

[23] Walther Test. 07/20/09, 02:24:04, tape 22/3/09/CD/108-3.

[24] Schultz v. U.S. Navy, 810 F.2d 1133, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

[25] Id. See also Edgerton v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 768 F.2d 1314, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1985.).

[26] Petrilli Test. 07/16/09, 03:27:50 p.m., tape 22/3/09/CD/108-2; see also PX 13, App. 28.

[27] Id.

[28] Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Co. Hous. Auth., 132 S.W.3d 790, 807 (Ky. 2004).


[1] Hamilton v. CSX Trans., 208 S.W.3d 272 (Ky.App. 2006).

[2] Record at 2162.

[3] Record at 2163-2167.

[4] Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Hous. Auth., 132 S.W.3d 790, 807 (Ky. 2004).

[5] Record 2163.

[6] Record 2165.

[7] Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Hous. Auth., 132 S.W.3d 790, 807 (Ky. 2004).

[8] Record at 2053-2070.

[9] See, e.g., Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170, 173 (10th Cir. 1982).

[10] Fuelling v. New Vision, 2008 U.S.App. LEXIS 13915 (6th Cir, 2008) at 14; see also Logan v. Denny’s, 259 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2001) Further, according to Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 152 (D.C., 1993), the burden for proving these prima facie elements is “not onerous.”

[11] Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Co. Housing Authority, 132 S.W.3d 790, 803 (Ky. 2004).

[12] Record 2167.

[13] Hearing on the jury instructions to be given, 7/28/09, 08:10:47—08:11:51 a.m., tape 22/3/09/CD/108-8.

[14] Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Hous. Auth., 132 S.W.3d 790, 807 (Ky. 2004).

[15]Parker v. Board of Regents of Tulsa Junior College, 981 F.2d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir. 1992).

[16]Scharf v. Dept. of Air Force, 710 F.2d 1572, 1574 (U.S. Ct. App. Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Pearlman v. United States, 490 F.2d 928, 993 (Ct. Cl. 1974)).

[17] Scharf at 1574. (Emphasis added.)

[18] Commonwealth of Ky v. Stosberg, 948 S.W.2d 425 (Ky. App. 1997).

[19] Id. at 427.

[20] Northeast Health Management, Inc. v. Cotton and Howell, 56 S.W.3d 440 (Ky. App. 2001).

[21] Id. at 446.

[22] Walther Test. 07/20/09, 02:00:57, tape 22/3/09/CD/108-3.

[23] Walther Test. 07/20/09, 02:24:04, tape 22/3/09/CD/108-3.

[24] Schultz v. U.S. Navy, 810 F.2d 1133, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

[25] Id. See also Edgerton v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 768 F.2d 1314, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1985.).

[26] Petrilli Test. 07/16/09, 03:27:50 p.m., tape 22/3/09/CD/108-2; see also PX 13, App. 28.

[27] Id.

[28] Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Co. Hous. Auth., 132 S.W.3d 790, 807 (Ky. 2004).